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EVIDENCE FOR THE NATIONAL BANKING ERA, 1880-1914
ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine the evidence for two competing
views of how monetary and financial disturbances influenced the
real economy during the national banking era, 1880-1914.
According to the monetarist view, monetary disturbances affected
the real economy through changes on the liability side of the
banking system's balance sheet independent of the composition of
bank portfolios. According to the credit rationing view,
equilibrium credit rationing in a world of asymmetric information
can explain short-run fluctuations in real output. Using
structural VARs we incorporate monetary variables in credit
models and credit variables in monetarist models, with
inconclusive results. To resolve this ambiguity, we invoke the
institutional features of the national banking era. Most of the
variation in bank loans is accounted for by loans secured by
stock, which in turn reflect volatility in the stock market.
When account is taken of the stock market, the influence of
credit in the VAR model is greatly reduced, while the influence
of money remains robust. The breakdown of the composition of
bank loans into stock market loans (traded in open asset markets)
and other business loans (a possible setting for credit
rationing) reveals that other business loans remained remarkably
stable over the business cycle.
Michael D. Bordo Peter Rappoport
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Rutgers University Rutgers University





New York, N.Y. 100031.Introduction
The provisions of the Acts of 1863 and 1865 that established the
national hsnking system were designed to remedy two perceived defects of
the antehellum state banking systems. One was the circulation of a wide
variety of state bank notes, often at a discount, which made for an
inefficient payments system.The second defect was instability of the
note issue, marked by overissue, bank runs and failures, and periodic
suspensions of convertibility into specie. To resedy the firat defect,
state bank notes were replaced by national bank issues of U.S. bond-
secured currency.To remedy the second defect, stringent reserve and
capital requirements, oversight and regulation by the Comptroller of the
Currency were conditiona for national bank charters. Unfortunately, the
remedies did not work as intended by the architects of the national
banking system. Instead, it was characterized by monetary and cyclical
instability, four banking panics, frequent atock market crashes, and other
financial disturbances.
In this paper we examine the evidence for two competing views on how
monetary and financial disturbances influenced the resl economy during the
nationsl bsnking era. These views stress either the asset or the
liability side of the banking system's balance sheet as the way in which
monetary shocks are transmitted.
According to one view -- themonetarist view -- theway in which
monetary disturbances, such as gold flows and banking panics in the
national banking era, affected the real economy was through changes on the
liability side of the banking system'a balance aheet.1 Changes in bank
deposits impinge directly and indirectly (through changing interest rates)
on spending, while the composition of bank portfolios (reflected on theasset side of the balance sheet) is not important in explaining
transmission
According to the alternative view -- thecredit rationing view --
thecomposition of the asset side is imporrant: chsnges in bank loans and
other credit variables, independent of changes in the quantity of money,
are the determinants of real fluctuations in the national banking period.2
Banks engage in credit rationing rather than raise interest rates because
in a world of asymmetric information a rise in interest ratesmay
encourage adverse selection, that is, borrowing by individuals and firms
more likely to default. This approach follows an older tradition
stressing the asset side of the balance sheet.3
Theoretically, credit rationing has been cast as an equilibrium
concept. Several authors have suggested that changes in the equilibrium
quantity of credit rationing can explain short-run fluctuations in real
output.4 The idea is that changes in the "level of uncertainty" in the
economy induce changes in the equilibriu.xn quantity of loans, and thereby
affect real activity.
Recently Calomiris and Hubbard provided support for the credit
rationing view for the national banking period.5 We have followed their
approach but expand their simultaneous equations model by considering
additional factors that could explain the link they find between credit
and the real economy.Our evidence suggests that it is difficult to
distinguish between the two views. When monetary variables are introduced
into the credit model, money is significant and credit declines in
importance though its contribution is not eliminated.When credit
variables are introduced into the monetariat model, money is robust butcredit effects sre siso significsnt.
The inconclusive simultsneous equstions results hsve led us to
examine institutional data for the national banking period for evidence
that helps distinguish between the two views. The key feature is the
intimate connection between the stock msrket and the national banking
system. A substantial fraction of the reserves of all national banks
ended up being invested in the New York City call loan market. We show
that loans secured by stock in New York City were volatile, but other
loans were not. A similar but more muted pattern is found for the United
States as a whole. Yet other loans comprise direct loans to businesses
and so are the principal candidates for credit effects, if such effects
were present.
This pattern suggests that disturbances in the stock market were
mirrored in the call loan matket, which in turn dominsted total New York
City bank losns and, to a lesser extent, total 11.5. loans.Thus the
significant influence of bank loans found in credit models may simply be
reflecting volatility in the stock market. To test this possibility, we
introduce a stock price index and the call loan rate into a simultaneous
equations model incorporating both loans and money. The effect is to
reduce greatly the influence of bank loans on real activity. The
influence of money, however, remains robust.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains
themoney and credit tationing views.We first set out the credit
rationing story and contrast it with the money story. We then trace the
effects to be expected from various shocks according to the two views,
beginning with the more familiar modern setting with a central bank that4
engages in open market sales that reduce hank reserves and money supply,
with contractionary effects on national income. Then we turn to a gold
standard aetting, subject to gold outflows, in which banking panics occur.
Section 3 reviews past attempts to assess the roles of money and
credit in the transmission mechanism, and then turns to the empirical
results of four simultaneous equations models of quarterly data that we
present to test the two views.
Section 4 examines the role of the stock and call loan markets. We
describe the relation between the inverted pyramid of credit and the call
loan market. Data from the Comptroller of the Currency's annual reports
reveal the diverse pattern of loans secured by stock and other bank loans.
We present a simultaneous equations model incorporating stock market
variables, money, and U.S. loans.
Section 5 summarizes the paper, drawing lessons for research
strategy.
2. Money versus Credit Rationing Theory
A considerable theoretical and empirical literature exists on
whether the monetary system affects the real economy through the
liability or the asset aide of the banking system.6
Emphasis on bank credit as an alternative or additional channel to
money goes back to Adam Smith and the classical economists. The real
bills doctrine that dominated both nineteenth and early twentieth century
thinking atressed that bank lending based strictly on self-liquidating
commercial bills would alwaya be sufficient to finance economic activity.Keynes in The General Theory suggested the possibility of credit
rationing. That suggestion led to the availability doctrine, whereby the
Federal Reserve would influence the availability of bank loans through its
open market operations.7 It was assumed that changes in bank deposits
would be offset by substitution into nonmonetary assets. Hence the only
way the monetary authorities could affect spending was by influencing
total credit.8 A modern proponent of these view bases them on extensive
empirical evidence showing a close connection between various credit
aggregates and economic activity.9
In the past decade, various authors have given a new impetus to the
credit approach.'° Based on the theory of incomplete information and the
seminal "lemons" article,11 they have argued for a theory of 'equilibrium
credit rationing. 12In their view, the market for loans is a customer
market where factors other than price are important, unlike the auction
markets which characterize many other commodities. Specifically, because
of asymmetric information available to lenders and borrowers, a rise in
the loan rate, by encouraging adverse selection (a predominance of loan
applicants with risky projects) and moral hazard (engaging in risky
behsvior after receiving a loan) on the part of borrowers, can increase
the incidence of defaults and reduce the real return earned by the
lenders. Under these circumstances, banks will charges "lemons premium"
to highly qualified borrowers, causing them to reduce their borrowing, and
will restrict loans to marginal borrowers. With equilibrium credit
rationing, loan rates will not rise to cleat the loan market. The supply
curve is backward bending. In a macro setting, this theory predicts that
restrictive monetary pol.icy will lead to a reduction in bank lending with6
little influence on interest rates.Extensions of this approach view
commercial banks as important because they use their expertise to screen
borrowers and hence reduce the information asymmetry. One device used is
the posting of collateral. In this context, restrictive monetary policy,
if it produces bankruptcy and declines in net worth because of debt
deflation, will disrupt the valuable credit intermediation network created
by the banking system, further reducing bank lending and economic
activity. '
Withthese views in mind, we trace the transmission of both monetary
and real shocks according to the money and credit rationing views. We
initially focus on a modern setting, and then on the pre-Federml Reserve
System and the classical gold standard.
A. The Modern Setting
We compare the two views of transmission, first, following an open
market sale of government securities and second, following an unexpected
decline in exports.
1. An Open Market Sale of Government Securities
In the simplest Veraionof the money view, an open market sale
reduces the reserves of the commercial banks (we neglect the distinction
between borrowed and nonborrowed reserves).In the face of declining
reserves (assuming no excess reserves), the banks sell investments and
call in (do not renew) their loans. As a result deposits decline. The
decline in deposits leads to a fall in expenditures, which in turn reduces
output and the price level.Rising market interest rates as well as7
implicit rates connecting aaseta to service flows will be a key conduit
connecting money supply to spending. This approach assumes that deposits
and other financial assets are not close substitutes, whereaa loans and
other earning assets are)4'15
In the credit view, the open market sale reduces reserves and leads
to a decline in bank loans (presumably, because loans and investments are
not close substitutes, the former decline more). As in the money view,
deposits are reduced, but because of a high degree of substitution between
transaction balances and near-monies, there is little effect from this
source on spending. In the Stiglitz and Weiss approach, as the decline in
lending threatens to raise interest rates, the danger of adverse selection
and moral hazard increases for lenders, so banks reduce their lending
further (they engage in credit rationing). If the contrsctionary policy
leads to bankruptcies, a stock market crssh or deflation, then the decline
in the net worth of firms subjects lenders to greater moral hazard and
increases adverse selection. The reduction in the value of collateral can
lead to further declines in bsnk loans.
Both views assume that the central bank will act as a lender of last
resort to prevent the onset of a banking panic. The two views differ,
however, with respect to the empirical behavior of interest rstes and loan
aggregates at the business cycle peak. According to the money view, money
growth decelerates during mid-expansion snd is accompanied by s rise in
interest rates that persists beyond the business cycle peak and well into
the recession phase.According to the credit rationing view, interest
rates do not exhibit this pattern because of the problems banks are said
to confront should interest rstes rise. According to the money view, theallocation of credit between loans and investments in bank portfolios has
no effect on the aggregate of deposits. Banks expand their portfolios and
deposits with the availability of reserves.According to the credit
rationing view, banks withdraw from loan expansion when their attitude
toward loan applicants hardens and that contracts the economy.
2. A Decline in Exports
The outcome of a transitory real shock, such as a decline in
exports, according to the money view, depends on the actions of the
central bank. In the absence of a shock to hank reserves, banks will hold
excess reserves, and will lower interest rates. If demand for loans does
not increase in response to the interest rate decline, banks will expend
their portfolio of investments. A stable money supply and lower interest
rates will eventually provide a stimulus to the economy.
In the credit view, a transitory real shock that lowers the demand
for loans may be exacerbated if the degree of uncertainty is affected.'6
If uncertainty is increased, this will cause banks to reduce their lending
further, because of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems
mentioned above. Unlike the money view, the credit rationing view, as
represented by Stiglitz,'7 provides no role for accommodating monetary
policy to mitigate the effects of a real shock.
B. The National Bankint Era
In the pre-Federal Reserve setting, two key institutional
differences affected the transmission mechanism: the absence of a central
bank and the classical gold standard.The first factor was important7
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in the net worth of firms subjects lenders to greater moral hazard and
increases adverse selection. The reduction in the value of collateral can
lead to further declines in bank loans.
Both views sssume that the central bsnk will act as a lender of last
resort to prevent the onset of a banking panic. The two views differ,
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central bank. In the absence of a shock to bank reserves, banks will hold
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not increase in response to the interest rate decline, banks will expand
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In the credit view, a transitory real shock that lowers the demand
for loans may be exacerbated if the degree of uncertainty is affected.'6
If uncertainty is increased, this will cause banks to reduce their lending
further, because of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems
mentioned above. Unlike the money view, the credit rationing view, as
represented by Stiglitz,'7 provides no role for accommodating monetary
policy to mitigate the effects of a real shock.
B. The National Banking Era
In the pre-Federal Reserve setting, two key institutional
differences affected the transmission mechanism: the absence of a central
bank and the classical gold standard.The first factor was important9
because an effective lender of last resort did not exist.18 The
importance of the second factor was that a gold outflow, induced typically
either by a rise in Bank Rate by the Bank of England or by a dramatic
harvest failure -- areal shock that led to a deficit in the current
account --reducedmonetary gold reserves.
1. A Gold Outflow
Uben the Bank of England raised its discount rate, this led to a
short-term capital outflow from the United States and a gold outflow that
reduced the reserves of the commercial banks.19 According to the money
view, both loans and investments declined, pan passu with deposits,
interest rates rose, and spending declined along with output and prices.
A key difference from the modern setting could, however, arise. There was
no ready source of high-powered money to replace the loss of monetary
reserves. In addition, if the external drain was also accompanied by an
internal drain, such as a seasonally-induced demand for reserves by
country national banks, the possibility arose of a banking panic generated
by a decline in the public's deposit-currency ratio as well as the bankihg
system's deposit-reserve ratio.25 This could produce a further decline
in the money supply. Resultant bank failures could lead to bankruptcies,
reductions in firma' net worth, and further bank failures, as the value of
bank assets declined. This process could continue unless some authority
intervened as lender of last resort or the convertibility of deposits into
currency was suspended.
In the credit view, the decline in bank reserves reduced loans (more
than investments and more than deposits), as it would today, but the
incipient rise in interest rates could lead to credit rationing because of10
adverse selection and moral hazard. The fall in activity and the price
level would reduce the value of bank collateral, causing a further
reduction in bank loans. If a banking panic ensued, this exacerbated the
process, leading to a rise in the cost of intermediation. A stock market
crash also would reduce the net worth and collateral of firms, in turn
reducing bank lending.
2. A Harvest Failure
In the money view, a transitory real shock such as a harvest failure
reduced output.If country banks withdrew reserve balances from their
city correspondents and reduced loans and deposits, the national banking
system contracted. A fortuitous short-term capital inflow from abroad
could, however, cut short this process of decline. If the inflow did not
occur, interest rates fell, leading to a gold outflow. The gold outflow
reduced the money supply, output, and the price level until equilibrium
was restored, If a banking panic ensued, further declines in the money
supply occurred.
In the credit rationing view, the story is the same for the modern
period and the national banking era. The real shock reduced the demand
for loans and the level of interest rates. If uncertainty increased, bank
lending would be reduced, reflecting adverse selection and moral hazard.
If bankruptcies, declines in net worth, and debt deflation ensued, then
further declines in bank lending occurred.Finally, if the real shock
caused a stock market crash, then equity rationing might follow, as
declines in the net worths of firms made it harder for them to obtain
external finance,2'11
3. Honey versus Credit: Some Empirical Results
Before presenting our ownempiricalresults, we review some earlier
studies. An early approach compared correlations between bsnk loans (and
other credit aggregates) and economic activity and those between various
monetary aggregates and activity in the post-World War II United States,
with the result that credit usually dominated.22 In contrast, a study
based on Oranger-causality tests and standard Vector Autoregressions
(VARs)23 led to the conclusion that money dominated credit.24
These tests examine the reduced form predictive power of money and
credit vsrisbles, which is not necessarily the same as their causal role.
In particular, it is necessary to abstract from contemporaneous effects of
output on financial variables. One approach was to run a race between
money and credit by identifying episodes in the post-World War II period
when a contractionary monetary policy was adopted independent of the state
of the real economy.25 In this approach univariate forecasting
regressions lead to the conclusion that money is an active force in
transmission, with bank lending a reflecting force.
Another approsch is that of structural 'JARs, according to which,
when explicit allowance is made for contemporaneous interactions between
output and credit and money, bank loans account for at least as much of
the variance of output as money.26 Subsequently the approach wss applied
to the pre-1914 national banking era.27
Assessing the relative merits of the money and credit rationing
explanations requires that one disentangle a complex set of interactions
among economic variables. This task is complicated by different views
about the structure of these interactions held by the two schools of12
thought. In this section of the paper, we use a structural VARapproach
to analyze a number of different models of the relationships among the
variables of central concern to the money and credit views.
Structural VARs involve a strategy for identifying parameters in a
simultaneous equation model, that preserves some of the intent of the
original Cowles Commission approach, while remaining sensitive to Sims'
(1980) criticism of the "incredible" identification assumptions it
necessitated.28 The cost of this compromise is that the structural VAR
approachrequires the investigator to have great faith in the validity of
all aspects of the model.
The structural and reduced forms of a linear simultaneous system can
be expressed as






Here, Y and X are row vectors, respectively, of observations on the K
endogenous and H exogenous or predetermined variables. U end V are K
element row vectors of reduced form and structural errors, respectively.
The structural parameters are contained in the matrices F, B and E, whose
respective dimensions are K*K, H*K and K*K, while 0 and 0 are H*K and K*K
matrices of reduced form coefficients that can be estimated consistently13
from OLS regression of Y on X.
Identification is accomplished by placing sufficient restrictions on
the structural coefficient matrices,29 that there is a unique solution
for r, fiandS is possible from equations (3) and (5), given fl and 0. The
three prominent approaches to identification can be summarized as:
(a) Restrict r and B, and leave S unrestricted (Cowles).
(b) After ordering the endogenous variables in a suitable manner,
make r triangular, S diagonal, and leave B unrestricted (standard VAR).
(c) Impose K(K-l) restrictions on I' and 5, and leave B unrestricted
(structural VAR).
The rationale for the Cowles approach was that the structural errors
contained the effects of variables not captured by the model, and since
there could be no presumption that the same variables had not been omitted
from more than one equation, one would expect the elements of Vt to be
correlated contemporaneously. This implied that a total of K(K-l) zero
restrictions needed to be placed on the r and B matrices.
Sims3° criticized this approach, arguing that it was difficult to
believe the exclusion restrictions typically used, especially in the light
of rational expectations models that conditioned people's behavior, and
therefore observable variables, on all available past data. He advanced
the standard VARapproach,without claiming it represented structural
relationships. However, several authors argued that little meaningful
could be said unless a structural interpretation were placed on the
triangular form of I' used in Sims' approach, which, in turn, did not seem
plausible.3'
The structural VARapproachadopts Sims' skepticism concerning14
restrictions on B, but sides with the Cowles approach in maintaining that
restrictions on F are sensible.There are K(K-l) free elements in F,
which ia the number of restrictions required for identification. The less
restrictions placed on F, the more must be imposed on Z.Typically, the
maximum of K(K-l)/2 restrictions are placed on >, making it diagonal.32
This strains credibility from the Cowles viewpoint, since it does not
allow for correlation among variables omitted from equations: it is
tantamount to an extreme expression of faith in the specification of the
model,
In identifying the models that follow, we use the diagonal-E
structural VAR strategy. This, in turn, necessitates that K(K-l)/2 of
the elements of F be zero. Since we are very far from believing any of
these models to be the last word, we shall attempt to trace patterns that
are consistent with the results of all the models.
In all, we present four models in this section. The first two
specifications we estimate include only the variables considered relevant
to the determination of real output by proponents of the money and credit
views, respectively.The drawback with these models is that neither
allows for the effects of variables considered important by the other
story: neither is sufficiently rich to distinguish the roles of the asset
and liability sides of the banks' balance sheets. In order to compare the
merits of the two stories, we need to nest the two models in e larger
model. Unfortunately, such a system would be computationally intractable,
and so we present a separate generalization for each model.
All models are estimated using quarterly data spanning the period
l880.I-l914.IV. All variables except those involving interest rates enter15
the estimated models as quarterly rates of change, but, for the sake of
brevity, we refer to these changes as M2, real CNP, etc. The sources of
the data series used are described in the Appendix. The same estimation
procedure is used for all the structural VAR specifications that we
examine, and it will prove useful to describe it in detail in the context
of the first model we discuss.
A. Monetarist Model
Our basic monetarist model involves five variables, the monetary
base, M2, real GNP, the commercial paper rate and the CM? deflator. Thus
the vector Y in equation (1) is a row vector with five elements, the
observations at time tonthese five variables.The first step in
implementing the structural VARapproachis to run a vector autoregression
of the system, which is equivalent to estimating the reduced form (2).
The variables in X are four lagged values of each of the five variables,
a constant term, time trend, and three seasonal du2mnies. These reduced
form regressions produce estimates of the reduced form errors, U, which
are related to the structural errors, V, by the linear transformation r,
as shown in equation (4).The object of the second stage of the
estimation procedure is to extract estimates of r and E from the estimated
reduced form errors, essentially by using equation (5), which shows how
the covarjance matrix of U is related to these two parameter matrices.33
Equation (5) contains K +K(K-l)/2(15) distinct relationships. Before
the imposition of identification restrictions, Z has K ÷ K(K-1)/2 (15)
distinct parameters, and r has K2 (25). For a unique solution to equation
(5), K2 (25) restrictions on the parameters are required (to produce as16
many equations as unknowns). As discussed above, K (5) of these come from
normalizing diagonal elements of r' to unity, K(K-1)/2 (10) come from
restricting to be diagonal and the remaining K(K-l)/2 (10) come from
setting elements of I' to zero. The last type of restriction is a
limitation on the contemporaneous interactions among variables.34
Equivalently, in view of equation (4), it involves restrictions on the way
the observable reduced form errors, U, are composed of the unobserved
structural errors, Vt.
Using the letters 'b''m', 'y', 'i' and 'p' to refer to the base,
M2, real GNP, conssercial paper rate and GNP deflator, respectively, and












The Monetarist modelallowsthebaseto beaffected
contemporaneously only by interest rate and price shocks, reflecting the
operation of the gold standard.36Increases in the interest rate and
decreases in the inflation rate are postulated to increase the base, via
capital inflows.Some authors37 have argued that, during this period,
interest rate and price shocks from abroad were reflected fully and
quickly in domestic interest rate and price movements. These effects are
allowed for by the interest rate and price channels included in the base
equation. This explains why it is unnecessary to include explicit open17
economy variables.The money multiplier drives the dependence of the
money supply on the base, while liquidity preference accounts for the
presence of the interest rate. The presence of M2 in the output equation
reflects demand shocks, and the interest rate and inflation rate are
inserted to allow for the possibility of supply side, or real interest
rate shocks. The interest rate is influenced by M2 and real output as a
result of the demand for money. Finally, inflation is driven by shocks to
the quantity of money. Notice that, since E is assumed to be diagonal,
the shocks to each variable (vb, Vm, etc) are assumed independent of each
other.
The estimates of the contemporaneous interactions are shown in the
top panel of Table 1. As the table shows, three of the ten coefficients
do not have the anticipated signs. Several factors may be involved here,
besides the obvious possibility that the model is misspecified.First,
the theory we are using to predict the signs of these interactions is
comparative static in nature, and doea not necessarily require that the
predicted effects be contemporaneous. Second, even if the theory were to
apply to contemporaneous relationships, the synchronization of the
available data leaves much to be desired.38 For both of these reasons,
we believe it to be more appropriate to examine jointly the
contemporaneous and lagged influence of one variable on another, by using
impulse response functions and decompositions of the variance of forecast
errors.
Figure 1 shows the response of real output to innovations in the
base, M2 and the interest rate. Shocks to the levels of 142 and the base
have positive but permanent effects on output. Innovations in the interest18
rate have approximately a zero output effect on net, although the response
is initially positive for four quarters.
The relative importance of shocks assigned to each variable can be
assessed from the decomposition of the variance of the forecast errors,
which is shown in the lower panel of Table I. Here the columns correspond
to the sources of the shocks (i.e., which element of V is responsible),
and the row names are those of the variable being predicted. The horizon
of the forecasts is twelve quarters in all cases. The salient feature of
these results is that 26.8 percent of the variance of output forecast
errors is assigned to base and M2 innovations.It is also worth noting
that two-thirds of the variability of the interest rate comes from the
innovations to the base and the money supply, while innovations to the
interest rate have a considetably smaller effect.
In auxsmary, there is little in these resulta that would lead a
monetariat to revise his or her views on the nature of the transmission
mechaniam.
B. Credit Model
Table 2 describes the results of estimating a model designed to
capture the effecta of variables important to the credit view. This model
was developed by Calomiris and Hubbard, and is described in detail in
their paper.39 In their structural VAR, in addition to prices, output,
and interest rates, they introduce three variables to capture the role of
credit: real bank loans, a spread between risky and risklems assets of
similar maturity, and the liabilities of business failures. These
variables capture both traditional credit interpretationa and the19
determinants of equilibrium credit rationing.The spread and business
failures variables are intended to capture the increased "agency costs"
faced by lower quality firms in their efforta to raise funds in a
downturn.45 They do not include money in their model on the assumption
that the money supply was endogenous under the classical gold standard.4'
The model focuses on the effects of the loan msrket on economic
activity, snd so relates the real volume of losns to the spread between
interest rates on low- and high-grade loans,42 and the rste of business
failures. Calomiris and Hubbard used a monthly series on loans extended
at national banks in New York, Boston and Philadelphia, while we use total
nstional bank loans for the entire United States. Similarly, our output
variable is real CNP, while they used the monthly pig-iron series.In
spite of these differences, in addition to the fact that their sample
spanned the 1894-1909 period, the results from the two versions of the
model are quite similar.43
As with the basic monetarist model, not all structural coefficients
are of the anticipated signs, the most notable being the positive impact
of the interest rate on output.The impulse response functions show a
healthy impact of loan innovations on output, and also exhibit the initial
positive response to interest rate shocks found in the monetarist model
(Figure 2). The most striking feature of the results is the 35.9 percent
of output forecast error variance explmined by loan innovations.
Calomiris and Hubbard found that only 10.6 percent of this variance could
be explained by real loan shocks in their monthly data.We will have
occasion to return to this difference in section 4 below. In summary, the
basic credit model, applied to the national banking era, does not turn up20
any evidence that would lead one to doubt it.
Uybrid Monetarist Model
Table 3 describes the results of estimating a hybrid monetarist
model, expanded by adding credit variables. Thus, we add business
failures and the spread variable to the five variables of the basic
monetarist specification. In addition, we use the money supply and
base, since, from the credit viewpoint, it is real balance sheet variables
that are important.Unfortunately, we sre not able to add the losns
variable to the basic monetarist model, because of the close relationship
between movements in the quantity of loans on the one hand, and the base
and money supply on the other. Of course, this difficulty dogs all tests
of the relative merits of the two views.44 This omission is remedied in
the fourth model, discussed below.
The identification restrictions in the top part of Table 3 sre
driven by those in the two basit models.Thus, increases in business
failures and the spread are anticipated by the credit view to have a
depressing effect on M2, real GNP and the deflator, after the monetarist
effects of the first model have been accounted for, while an increase in
business failures is expected to increase the spread between rates on low-
and high-quality bonds. The dependence of business failure and spread
innovations on interest rate and price innovations is as specified in the
basic credit model. A substantially higher proportion of the
contemporaneous interactions have the wrong sign than in the basic
monetarist model, the most egregious being the response of M2 to the base,
and of real output to money. However, there is a strong positive response21
of output to M2 innovations after two quarters have elapsed (Figure 3).
Money innovstions appear to have a smaller permanent effect on the level
of output, and the permanent effect of base innovations has disappeared.
Similarly, the proportion of the output forecast error variance explained
by money add base innovations is 25 percent, little changed from the 26.8
percent found in the basic monetarist model. We also note that the
variables added to represent the credit story, the interest rste spread
and the rate of business failures, together explain only 9.6 percent of
the variability of real Cr42, which approximsLely matches their performance
in the basic credit model.
D. Hybrid Credit Model
Table 4 describes the results of expanding the basic credit model
to include the effects of changes in the quantity of money. The delicate
issue here is whether loans and money should be expressed in real or
nominal terms.The credit view holds that it is the real quantity of
loans that is important for real output, while the monetarist view focuses
on the short run output effects of changes in the nominal quantity of
money.The specification of Table 4 casts both variables in nominal
terms, but allows for real effects to be consistently estimated by
including the inflation rate in the output and loans equations.45
The responses of real Cr42 to nominal loans and money both die out
after about three years, as Figure 4 shows. Loans exhibit a substantial
permanent change in response to a money shock, hut there is not a marked
response of money to a loan shock. Similsrly, the vsrisnce decompositions
in the lower panel of Table 4 show thst 26.3 percent of loan variability22
is accounted for by money shocks, while only 5.9 percent of money
variability comes from loan shocks. This may, however, be a consequence
of including money in the loan equation, while excluding a contemporaneous
effect of loans on the supply of money. For this reason, the model is to
be understood as a monetarist generalization of the credit model.
The variance decomposition also shows that the fraction of the
forecast error variance of real output attributable to loan shocks
declines dramatically, from 35.9 percent in the basic credit model, to 16
percent, when money is included. The contribution of money shocks to the
forecast error variance of real output is 14.3 percent. These figures do
not provide an exact comparison with the basic credit model, however,
since there loans enter in real terms. To provide such a comparison, we
recalculated the variance decomposition to assess the effect of real loan
shocks on real output, leaving money in nominal terms. The results, which
are shown in the addendum to Table 4, are little changed, although the
influence of money shocks declines slightly, while that of real loan
shocks is 2.5 percentage points larger than that of nominal loan shocks.
The central message of this "hybrid credit model" is that the
channel of influence on output that operates through the money supply
cannot be ignored. Of course, loan shocks still account for a respectable
fraction of the variance of output forecast errors, even after money
shocks have been allowed for, and this is perhaps a greater surprise to
the monetarist camp than to the credit view.However, it is always
possible that the loan variable is picking up shocks to the base, which is
not included in this model.
The message of this section thus turns out to be generally negative23
as to the possibility of a clear choice between the two schools of
thought, using such aggregate data. The basic models both appear
reasonably soothing to members of the associated school. The hybrid
monetarist model leaves the money story intact when the interest rate
spread and business failures are added, but credit proponents could argue
that the base variable is accounting for the effects of loans. The hybrid
credit model suggests that money effects are important in addition to
those said to operate through the asset side of the banks' balance sheets,
but it is not a plank of the credit platform to say that money does not
matter at all. The close comovement between loans, money and the base
also clouds the interpretation here: monetarista could argue that the
incremental explanatory power of the loans variable arises because its
inclusion helps to separate base shocks from money demand shocks.
It therefore appears that other data must be consulted, if we are
ultimately to be able to assess the relative merits of the two views. We
offer a first step in this direction in the next section of the paper, by
examining the composition of loans.
4. The Role of the Stock Market and Call Loan Market in the Institutional
Framework. 1880-1914
The results of the VARs in the preceding section, if taken at face
value, suggest that both bank loans and money are important in the
transmission mechanism.However, the institutional structure of the
national banking era directs attention to the fundamental reason for the
importance of bank loans in this period -- theintimate connection between
the stock market and the national banking system established by the24
inverted pyramid of credit and the New York call loan marker.
Disturbances to the stock market translated themselves into the call loan
market, which in turn had a dramatic impact on total bank loans in New
York City and in the rest of the country.
A key feature of the regulations that defined the national banking
system was the imposition of different reserve requirements on three
separate classes of national banks.Specifically, the Act of 1874
required country banks to hold 15 percent against their deposits, three
fifths of which, or 9 percent, could be held as bankers' balances with
correspondent national banks in reserve cities (with populations greater
than 50,000) or in central reserve cities (New York and, after 1887, also
Chicago and St. Louis). These balances earned up to 2 percent. The
remaining two-fifths of required reserves were to be held in lawful money
(U.S. notes, specie, gold and clearing-house certificates). Reserve city
national banks were required to hold 25 percent of their deposits in
reserves, half of which had to be held in lawful money, the other half
available to be held as bsnkers' balances in central reserve city nationsl
banks.Central reserve city national banks were required to hold 25
percent of their deposits in lawful money.46 Country and reserve city
banks kept excess reserves far above the required levels in the form of
bankers' balances in central reserve cities. These funds were a form of
secondary reserves. The reserve structure of the national banking system
has been described as an inverted pyramid, whereby most of the nation's
reserves ended up as bankers' balances in the central reserve cities, but
especially in New York.47
Most of the reserves held as bankers' balances in New York nstions].25
banks were invested in the call loan market. Call loans were demand loans
secured by stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange and also by U.S.
and other bonds. Most of the loans were made to brokers who would then
consign the stock serving as collateral to the banks. The commercial
banks considered call loans the most liquid form of investment, since they
could be called at any time. The New York national banks dominated the
call loan market, with between a third and a half of their loan portfolios
in call loans during the period we cover.48Close to 75 percent of
bankers' balances in New York were held in call loans between 1880 and
1904, the amount to be expected if the New York banks held the required 25
percent reserve requirement against those balances. In addition, country
and reserve city national banks and state commercial, savings, and trust
companies invested directly in the call loan market (using their central
reserve city correspondents as intermediaries) whenever the call loan rate
rose significantly above the 2 percent earned on bankers' balances. Thus
an inverse relationship existed between the call loan rate and bankers'
balances in New York City and a direct one between the call loan rate and
country bank excess reserves invested directly in the call loan market.49
The inverted pyramid as well as the correspondent balance
arrangement and its intimate connection to the call loan market are widely
regarded as key elements in financial crises that punctuated the era.50
All the major banking panics of the period (1873, 1884, 1893, 1907) were
marked by withdrawals of bankers' balances (especially those representing
excess reserves) by the country and reserve city banks from the New York
banks. The decline in bankers' balances in turn put pressure on the call
loan market, causing call loan rates to rise and stock prices to fall --26
possibly inducing a stock market crash, The decline in New York bank
reserves could on occasion be so severe as to precipitate a psnic, which
could only be stopped by the restriction of convertibility of deposits
into currency.
The evidence is mixed on whether the combined incidence of stock
market crashes and banking panics during the national banking ers reflects
causation from the banking system or vice versa.51 Although there were
twice as many crashes as there were panics, all of the major banking
panics also occurred close to stock market crashes.On a number of
occasions (1899 and 1901), ayndicatea of prominent financial institutions
were able to reverse the pressure on the New York call loan market.52 On
other occaaions, panic was averted by the issue of clearing-house
certificates by the New York Clearing House and/or by Treaaury
intervention (1884, 1890).However, on three occasions, (1873, 1893,
1907) this intervention was insufficient to prevent panic. Only a
restriction of convertibility of deposits into currency sufficed.
This experience suggests that a potential source of volatility in
bank loans may lie in call loans.If that is the came this makes
questionable the importance of credit rationing. To consider this
possibility we examine more closely the composition of loans in New York
City national banks and in national banks in the reat of the country.
Bank loans were either demand or time loans, some secured by
different types of collateral: stocks and bonds, merchandise, and
receivables. The latter two categories of aecured loans were typically
issued on the real bills principle that they would be self-liquidating.53
The balance sheets of the New York City national banks had similar27
categories to that of the country national banks, but the composition was
quite different, reflecting the fact that New York City banks held no
excess reserves.
Of the categories of assets just noted, credit rationing would refer
to loans secured primarily by merchandise, since discounts and call loan
rates were determined in active national markets.
We show in Figures 5 and 6 data for one call date annually (usually
in September), 1880-1914, two categories of national bank loans as well as
total national bank loans for New York City and for all national banks.5
The two categories are loans secured by stocks and other loans.55
The pattern that emerges from these figures is quite striking. New
York City loans secured by stock are highly volatile, exhibiting sharp
declines in the panic years 1884, 1893, and 1907 and slight declines in
two years with stock market crashes and no banking panics (1895 and 1899).
Other New York City loans by contrast are distinctly stable, with a mild
upward trend, and the movement of total New York City loans reflects that
of loans secured by stock.56
For the United States as a whole, the pattern of loans secured by
stock is much less volatile than for New York City, but declines in the
panic years can be discerned. Other loans have a stable upward trend.
While total United States loans pick up some of the volatility of New York
City loans, they are considerably more stable.51
The stable pattern of other loans compared to loans secured by stock
in New York City and, to a lesser extent, a similar difference in the
composition of loans in the United States as a whole, in country banks,
and in the United States minus New York City, suggest that whatever28
procyclical influence is exhibited by loans in New York City and for the
United States as a whole can be explained by the behavior of the call loan
aarket.On the face of it, this leaves little room for an independent
influence on output variability of credit rationing.
There remains, however, the question of the link between the decline
in the valuation of firms reflected in a fall in stock prices, and
declines in real output. On the one hand, this does not impinge directly
on the credit rationing story, which is typically limited to borrowers who
must resort to bank loans. On the other hand, some authors have argued
that a stock market crash can increase agency coats, causing investment
and real activity to decline.58To measure the importance of this
channel of influence on real output, it is evidently necessary to control
for that part of stock price movements that is due to changes in
fundamentals, a subject for possible future research.
To demonstrate the link between the stock market and loans secured
by stock, we plot in Figure 7 annual data in natural logs of New York City
loans secured by stock and the stock price index.Figure 8 makes a
similar comparison between United States loans secured by stock and the
stock price index. As can readily be seen in Figure 7, volatility in the
stock price index is reflected in the New York City stock loan series.
The relationship is somewhat less transparent in Figure 8 for U.S. loans
secured by stock.
One inference that can be drawn from Figures 7 and 8 is that the
significant results obtained for bank loans and other credit variables in
the VARs reported in section 3 reflect stock market disturbances, where
the principal stocks traded were railway stocks. These disturbances in29
turn could be reflecting earlier or contemporaneous monetary shocks,59 or
future output shocks.6° It is a mistake, however, to argue that the waves
of railroad construction in the late nineteenth century were independent
of financial markets, on the ground that 'There was no central bank to
mistakenly squeeze off economic activity by letting the money supply grow
too slowly."6' The stock market reflected banking panics and concerns
about the stability of the gold standard in the United States in 1890-97.
External finance that the stock market provided either advanced or
retarded railroad construction.
It appears from this discussion that the principal source of
volatility in the series of total loans is the category of loans
collateraled by stock, whose effects are not the subject of the credit
story. The collateral for these loans was publicly priced, and not in any
way idiosyncratic to the individual loan contract.Nor do the
characteristics of the borrower of such a loan enter into the pricing and
terms of the loan contract in any obvious way.Instead, it is the
business loans represented by "other loans" that more faithfully relate to
the credit view. This is so even if loans collateraled by stock were not
used for stock purchases but, as money is fungible, were applied to
business use.
Ideally, instead of the aggregate loans series used in the
estimation exercise of the preceding section, it would be desirable to
rerun it with data on other loans.Unfortunately, quarterly data on
disaggregated categories of loans are not available for this period.
Instead, we have formulated a structural VAR model, which includes in
addition to the quarterly growth of aggregate loans, the quarterly change30
in stock prices, and the call loan rate. The latter variables are proxies
for the pattern of stock market loans, and so their inclusion should go
some way toward "filtering" the stock market loans froa the series of
total loans.
The complete model, which also includes real GNP growth, real M2
growth, and the interest rate spread, is shown in Table 5. The call loan
rate is, in effect, serving both as an instrument for stock market loans,
and as a proxy for the commercisl paper rate. The exclusion of inflation
and the rate of business failures is explained by the need to limit the
size of the model. The results of the preceding section suggest that the
omission of these two variables is of little consequence.
As Figure 9 shows, the response of output to real money shocks does
not wash out in the long run, while the output response to loan
innovations is more muted and transitory.The variance decomposition
shows that 15.7 percent of the real loan forecast error variance is
accounted for by stock price and call loan rate innovations. While direct
comparisons cannot be made rigorously between models that are not nested,
it is nevertheless instructive to use the basic credit model of section 3
as a benchmark. In that model, 84.5 percent of loan variance comes from
loan innovations; with the inclusion of money and the proxies for stock
market loans, this proportion falls to 52.2 percent.62 There is also a
marked strengthening of the link between loans and the spread; 19.1
percent of loan vsrisbility comes from spread innovations, and 30.3
percent of spread variability comes from loan innovations in the stock
market model.In contrast, these proportions are 4.4 percent and 8.8
percent, respectively, in the basic credit model.These results are31
consistent with the discussion above of the significance of stock market
loans; the loans variable needs to be purged of the effects of stock
market loans in order to extract the essence of the credit interpretation.
The bottom line is surely the proportion of output forecast error
variance explained by loan innovations, which is 9.2 percent in this
model, significantly lower than the 35.9 percent registered in the basic
credit model, and the 16.0 percent in the hybrid credit model. It is also
of interest to note that, when the stock market model is run with loans by
New York City banks -- aseries similar to that used by Calomiris and
Hubbard (as noted above, with a far greater proportion of their loan
volume in the call loan market than was the case for total U.S. loans) --
thecontribution of loan innovations to the output variance forecast error
drops to 4.5 percent.63 Indeed a substantial fraction of the variability
in total United States loans is accounted for by movements in New York
loans, which in turn are largely composed of stock market loans. While
accounting for only one-sixth of total loans, the variance of New York
loans accounts for one-fourth of the variance of United States loans.
Insummary, as one would expect from examination of the breakdown of
loans into their various categories, loans other than stock market loans
arenot closely related to output fluctuations during the national banking
period. In contrast, the contribution of money to output variability is
consistently in the range of 12-18 percent, and the combined contribution
of money and the base is about 25 percent.
5.Conclusion
A growing theoretical literature of the past decade assigns a major32
role to credit rationing by banks, defined as a reduction in bank lending
with little change in interest rates, in influencing the course of the
real economy. The theory, elaborated in the context of existing banking
and monetary arrangementa, is far more developed than empirical
verification of its propositions. The moat advanced efforts at empirical
verification apply the method of structural VARa to a limited number of
variables deaigned to show that credit variablea account for a
preponderance of output forecaat error variance. Our point of departure
is the application of the method by Calomiris and Hubbard to the national
banking period.
We broaden the inquiry to encompass not only credit but also money
variables, and apply the atructural VARmethodologyto assess the relative
merita of money and credit explanations of real activity during the
national banking period. This approach requires identification
aaawuptions to be made concerning the contemporaneous interactions among
variables. Since this approach also implies that the resulting system of
simultaneous equations containa no substantive misspecification, it is
well to teat the robustness of the conclusions drawn from any one model by
changing the identification assumptions. Experience with the models used
in this paper counsels that one place stock in those conclusions that are
consistent with all models.
Table 6 summarizes our findings by showing the decomposition of the
output forecast error variance attributable to each model. The salient
feature of the estimation results is that the explanatory power of money
and the base is moderate and robust to changes in that specification of
the underlying model. Similarly, we repeatedly fail to find a sizesble33
output effect of the spread and business failures variables. Last, the
effect of loan variability on output fluctuations is highly sensitive to
changes in specification, and declines dramatically when money is
introduced into the model, and stock market loans are controlled for.
These results motivate the conclusion that there is little support
during the national banking era for the "credit" view of the transmission
mechanism: that the asset side of bank's balance sheets is a significant
determinant of output fluctuations. This inference, drawn from the
variAnce decomposition of our structural VAR exercises, is supported by
direct examination of the course of "other loans" (which we take to
represent business loans) over the national banking period. Other loans
exhibit little, if any, volatility, and so they cannot explain output
fluctuations.
Our findings raise a number of issues that cannot be addressed
within the confines of the present study. We have not examined whether
interest rates flatten out instead of continuing to rise as output growth
reaches a peak, which is a critical implication of the credit story. The
VAR methodology is limited to an examination of short-run interactions
among macroeconomic time series.The case of the equilibrium credit
rationing story is microeconomic in nature, and our data provide little
that can directly address the queation whether banks refrain from lending,
beyond a certain point, irrespective of their reserve positions.
Similarly, we find striking the lack of fluctuation in "other
loans", a series that seems to grow with GNP. This may reflect an extreme
form of customer relations between lenders and borrowers, or it may be a
consequence of the relative ease of acquiring loans in a growing economy34
whose banking sector more than quadrupled over the period of our study.
It appears that these issues would most fruitfully be addressed by a study
of banks' historical records.
Finally, we can ask whether it was the asset or the liability side
of bank balance sheets that contemporaries during the national banking
period regarded as problematical.For them, it was unquestionably the
liability side, in particular, the inflexibility during financial crises
of the banks' bond-secured note issues.
The policy conclusion that contemporaries reached was embodied in
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. That legislation provided for the issue
of asset-backed Federal Reserve notes that were, expected to vary with
changes in demand. Credit rationing by banks was neither a concern nor a
policy issue.64 In the new regime, the prescription was once again for
loans to be based on short-term self-liquidating bills. No essential
change was made in the regulations prevailing under the national banking
system with regard to credit.35
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Honey and Capital Markets (Princeton, 1978), chap.4; and H. Myers, fl
NewYork Money Market (New York, 1935). In the unit banking system that
arose earlier in the century, holding balances with city correspondents
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48. Myers, The New York Money Market, p. 290.42
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52. Myers, The New York Money Market, p. 286.
53. Other earning assets of the national banks were discounts and
investments. Discounts were usually not secured by collateral, and
differed from loans in that the interest charge was collected in
advance. Discounts consisted primarily of commercial paper, either in
the form of trade acceptances or lenders acceptances. Commercial paper
bore either two names or one name. The latter eclipsed the former by
the end of the period. These instruments usually traded in an active
national market, and the commercial paper rate fluctuated widely,
reflecting changing conditions in the money market. Investments
consisted of eligible U.S. securities required to back the note issue
and other U.S. securities held as a form of secondary reserves.
54. The source is U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Reoorta for
1880-1914.43
55. For 1880-88, the Comptroller showed four categories of loans:
(1) loans on United States bonds on demand;
(2) loans on other stocks, bonds, etc. on demand;
(3) loans on single-name paper without other security;
(4) all other loans.
From 1891 to 1914, the Comptroller showed five categories:
(1) loans on demand paper with one or more individual or firm names;
(2) loans on demand, secured by stocks, bonds, and other securities;
(3) loans on time, paper with two or more individual or firm names;
(4) loans on time, single-name paper (person or firm) without other
security;
(5) loans on time, secured by stocks, bonds, and other personal
securities, or on mortgages or other real estate securities.
For each of the years 1889 and 1890, the Comptroller showed
different categories, not readily comparable to those of the preceding
and subsequent periods, and they are consequently omitted from the
figures.
The first category of loans that we show in Figure 5 --loans
secured by stocks -- consistsfor 1880-88 of categories (1) and (2), and
for 1891-1914 of categories (2) and (5). The second category in Figure
5 --otherloans -consistsfor 1880-88 of categories (3) and (4), for
1891-1914, of categories (1), (3), and (4).
We also compared demand loans secured by stock (i.e., call
loans) -- category(2) -- tothe rest. The pictures are similar to those
presented here.
We also drew similar figures for country banks and total United
States minus New York City. However, to save space we discuss but do44
not present the former, and the pattern of the latter, which includes
country banks, reserve city banks, and central reserve cities other than
New York, can be inferred from the figures we present.
56. Within the category of other loans, one of the subcategories
exhibited more volatility than the total.
57. For country banks, loans secured by stock were also more volatile
than other loans, but the difference between the two categories was not
as marked as for New York City. Results are similar for the U.S. minus
New York City.
58. See Jaffee and Stiglitz, "Credit Rationing," and Mishkin,
"Asymmetric Information."
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System.
60. See C.W. Schwert, "Stock Returns and Real Activity: A Century of
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61. See J.B. De Long, "'Liquidation' Cycles: Old-Fashioned Real
Business Cycle Theory and the Great Depression,' (NBER Working Paper No.
3546, 1991), p. 29.
62. Note that this also happens in the hybrid credit model, when money
alone is included.
63. In this specification, the spread and loans variables once again
explain minimal proportions of each other's forecast error variance.
64. Calomiris and Hubbard quote examples of "credit rationing and
credit market segmentation" which they state "appear frequently in
Sprague" (p. 437) (see his History of Crises). However, we interpret the
relevance of these quotations somewhat less broadly than do Calomiris45
and Hubbard. All are drawn from Spragues chapter on thepanicof 1907,
and are intended to illustrate theinabilityof reserve-constrained
banks to lend freely.46
Appendix; Data Sources
Annual Series:
U.S. and New York City Loan Classification for one call date (usually
Septembet). U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report, 1880-1914.
Quarterly Series:
CM?, real and nominal; CM? deflator. MS. Balke and R.J. Cordon, "Hiatorical
Data," in R.J. Cordon, ed., The American Business Cycle: Continuity snd
(Chicago, 1986), App. B., App. Table 2, pp. 790-93.
U.S. loans. NBER Business Cycle tape, aeries 14,15, call dates interpolated to
3d month of the quarter.
New York City loans. NBER Business Cycle tape, series 14,20, call dates
interpolated to 3d month of the quarter.
M2. M. Friedman and A.J. Schwartz, Monetary Statistics of the United States;
Estimates, Sources, Methods (New York, 1970), Table 2, pp. 61-6.
Base. Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary Statistics (New York, 1970), Table 21,
pp. 346-50; Table 26, pp. 396-97, call dates interpolated to 3d month of
quarter.
Net gold flows. NBER Business Cycle tape, series 14,112, monthly, every third
month.
Commercial paper rates in Mew York City. FR. Macaulay, Some Theoretical
Problems Sugzested by the Movements of Interest Rates. Bond Yields and Stock
Prices in the United States Since 1856 (New York, 1938), App. Table 10, pp.
A147-A156, monthly, every third month.47
Call loan rates at the New York Stock Exchange. NBER Business Cycle tape.
series 13,01, monthly, every third month.
Spread. Unpublished quarterly data from F.S. Mishkin underlying his paper.
"Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical Perspective," in C.
Hubbard, ed., Financial Crises (Chicago, 1991).
Liabilities of business failures. NBER Business Cycle tape, series 9,32,
monthly, every third month.
Stock price index. J.W. Wilson, RE. Sylla, and C.P. Jones, "Financial Narket
Panics and Volatility in the Long Run, 1830-1988," in EN. White, ed., Crashes
and Panics: The Leasona from History (New York, 1990).Table 1
MONETARIST MODEL
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M2 43 + 0.886
-
(.264) (.469)















Base M2 Real GM? Comm. PaperInflation
Base 64.5 12.1 2.9 16.5 3.9
M2 30.1 30.7 6.9 24.5 7.8
Real CM? 8.5 18.3 52.2 12.1 8.9
Comm. paper 35.8 32.0 4.8 18.8 8.8
Inflation 11.0 2.9 2.2 4.0 80.0
'The entries in the table are the negative of the respective elements of
the transpose of I'. For example, the entry .43 means that the coefficient of
the contemporaneous effect of Base growth on M2 growth is .43. The '+sign
to the right of the coefficient signifies that its expected sign is positive.
2All variables except those involving interest rates are percentage rates
of change.
3Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 2
CREDIT MODEL





Paper Spread Deflator GNP
Business
Failures




Comm. paper - .187
-
( .037)





























Real Loans 82.2 7.9 5.8 2.1 0.7 1.2
Comm. paper 35.8 35.5 5.5 18.0 1.7 3.6
Spread 12.2 13.0 69.1 2.2 1.4 2.2
GNP Deflator 10.7 4.5 1.9 76.2 2.7 3.9
Real ON? 35.9 3.4 3.3 16.8 37.2 3.2
Bus, failures 8.5 12.3 0.7 6.1 0.4 71.9






Real Real Comm. Bus.
M2 ON? Paper Deflator FailuresSpread
Real Base -3.24 -1.25 -
(2.81) (1.03)







Real CNP -.012 + -.358
-.l5O-.071 -
(.24) (.28) (.18) (.06)
-.01 -
(.03)




















Real Real Comm. Bus.
M2 ON? Paper Deflator FailuresSpread
Real Base 13.6 73.1 1.5 2.3 4.3 3.2 1.9
Real M2 4.4 48.2 5.8 17.9 10.4 1.9 11.3
Real GNP 12.3 12.7 52.2 4.2 8.9 4.1 5.5
Comm. paper 32.4 24.6 5.4 8.7 10.9 5.4 12.5
ON? Deflator 2.3 48.7 3.0 21.0 18.2 3.3 3,5
Bus, failures 8.9 12.6 0.8 5.3 4.4 66.8 1.1
Spread 10.4 4.2 0.5 3.0 4.8 3.4 73.7














Comm. paper - .184
(.04)

































Loans 49.6 5.4 6.4 10.3 1.5 0.5 14.4
Comm. paper 16.2 41.7 9.3 7.7 2.9 3.0 19.1
Spread 9.6 9.9 57.1 10.8 1.2 2.9 8.5
Inflation 0.9 4.1 9.5 70.4 2.7 3.8 8.6
Real CNP 16.0 5.2 7.0 7.5 47.1 2.8 14.3
Bus, failures 3.6 8.2 0.8 5.0 0.5 76.0 5.8
M2 5.9 6.918.3 6.5 2.1 3.2 57.3
Real output 18.5
Addendum: Model Using Real Loans





Loans2 Stock Price GNP M2 SpreadCall Rate
Real Loans .15 + - .063+24.8 -- .20
-
Stock price .70 +
Real CNP .317 + - .158+ .17
- 683
-
Real M2 .564 - .028
-
Spread - .019







Loans Stock PriceReal CNP Real M2SpreadCall Rate
Real Loans 52.2 9.5 1.6 11.3 19.1 6.2
Stock price 4.9 70.3 5.8 11.4 2.5 5.0
Real CNP 9.2 14.0 54.1 16.8 1.7 4.1
Real M2 30.6 6.8 5.4 43.0 10.4 3.]
Spread 30.3 24.8 2.6 3.2 36.2 2.8
Call rate 6.3 12.3 2.2 8.2 2.7 66.3
Real GNP
Addendum: Model Using Real NY Loans
4.2 5.1 4.5 13.1 57.0 16.0
1.2 SeeTable I.
While a number of starting values converged to those reported in the
Table, which corresponded to the maximumfoundfor the likelihood function,
numerical computation of standard errors proved infeasible, as it was not
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OF REAL GNP TO UNIT SHOCK IN COMMERCIAL PAPER RATE
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RESPONSE OFLOANS TO UNIT SHOCK IN MONEY
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RESPONSE OF REAL. MGEY TO LWLIT SHOCK IN REAL LOANS
Fiojre 9
R€SPONSE OF REAL (NP TO UNIT SHOCKS IN REAL LOANS AAREAL MONEY
1O8lS- - - -
02I 6 8 0 2II IS